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AUTHORITY TO USE FORCE ON THE HIGH SEAS
Myres S. McDougal
I propose to organize my remarks in
this way: First, we will consider an
appropriate delimitation or clarification
of the general problem beforC' us. I
hrgin this way because I don't trust my
civilian prcdecessors: I'm not quite surc
that they havC' properly clarified international law, the law of the sC'a. aggrC's·
sion, self-defC'nse, and so forth for you.
AftC'r this clarification of tl)(' general
pJ;ohlem. wC' will devote ourselves to
four major types of sprcific prohlC'llls.
The first involvC's simply the military
usc or C'njoymC'nt of the oceans in timC's
of peare. The serond will rdate to the
maintenance of order upon the oceans
in times of pC'acC' - the implementation of claims to jurisdiction. The third
will rrlate to extraordinary measurC's
in self-help for the protection of national interests. The fourth will relate
to srlf-ddt'nsC' of national territorial
int<'grity and political indC'pC'ndt'nct'.
You will ohsC'rve that the latter two
typC's of prohlC'ms arC' very closely related. Srlf-dC'fem;C' is merely a dramatic
form of srlf·hdp. The laUC'r two typC's
of problC'ms, taken togrther, differ
sharply from the first two in that their
orrasion is a prior unlawful USC' of
for!"t' hy sonlt'hody othC'r than the party
claiming to l'mploy Iorcr in self-help.
The first two typC's of problems are
indC'pendent of anybody's unlawful use
of force. The latter two are dependent
upon somebody else's unlawful use of
foree. The reason I organize the proh-

lems in this way is to attempt to clarify
the fundamental community policies
that are at stake in each type of
problem. The common interest of
peoples differs considerably about these
different types of problems.
Now IC't's proceC'd to our first task,
the more precise delimitation of the
gC'nC'ral problem with which we are
concC'rncd. This docs call for a realistic
understanding of international law in
gC'nt'ral and of the law of the sea in
particular.

If '~'C' look about us on a global scalc
today, T think we can all see that all
pC'oplC's are caught in a world proct'SS
of t'ITective power. The interdC'tC'rminations, tl)!) interdepenclences of peoples
art' sUl'h that we today have a power
prot'C'SS. an dfC'ctive power procC'ss,
whi('h is glohal in its rt'a('h. TIlt' <It'ei·
sions that arc takC'n in Peking aITect
wliat's donC' in Washington or Moscow
and "irt' \'C'rsa. No state has complete
frC'edom of C'ITective choice today. We
arC' all scorpions in the same bottle.
When we look more closdy at these
C'ITt'ctive power decisions I think we
C'an sec that they are of two different
kinds. There are some choices that are
madt' and C'nrorct'd by simplC' nakC'd
1)()Wl'r 01' hy l'akulations of cXlwtlicncy.
ThC'f(' are, howC'ver, other decisions
that arc takC'1I from perspectives of
authority. By this I mC'an that they are
mad!' hy the people who are cxpeetC'd
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to make them; that they're made in
accordance with community expectations ahout how they should he made;
that they'n' taken in strurtufI' of authority, courts, or lrgislalures, or intcractions brtwc('n forrign offices; that the
people who make such decisions have
l'nough effective power to put them into
practice in a consequential number of
instances; that the decisions are taken
by employment of authorized procedures; and that the different types of
d('cisions taken embrace the whole
gamut neccssary to ordering the larg('r
community in which we live.
It is these lattcr decisions, those that
arc taken from perspectives of authority, that we appropriately call inter·
national law. International law is something morc than the words that you
read in all thl'se books. It's not simply,
as in the traditional definition. a body
of rules that governs the rrIations of
states. It is much more. It is the process
of actual dccision hy which the affairs
of the world ar(' ord('red in an effort to
darify and implement the common interests of the peopks of the world.
If, further, we look more closely at
these drcisions tak('n from prrspectives
of authority. as rontrnsted with thosl'
takrn hy naked pOWN. J think that w('
can sl'e that tl]('y too arc ('omposed of
lwo diffl'n'nt kinds of d(·('isions. 1'111'
first we eall th(' constitutive or "constitutional decisions-the decisions which
establish the process of authoritativl'
dl'cision. Thl'se are the d('cisions which
determin(' who the authorized decisionmakers are; what th(' appropriate hasic
community policies arc; what the cstablished structurcs of authority are;
what far-reaching decisions arl' authorized procedures; what hasl's of power
ar(' to 1)(' put at the disJlo:;al of deei1;ionmakers for the enforcenU'nt of
their choice; and so on.
The seeond type of decision we call
the public order decisions. These are

the dpcisions which establish the protpcled features of all value processps
othrr than power - which affect the
production and distribution of wpalth,
the sharing of enlightenment, respect
(civil Iibertics, human rights), health,
fn'l'dom of association, and so on
through all the valln's wp c1l1'ri!'h in
c'onll'lllporary society. Thrs(' an' tIll'
dl'cisions whieh ('slahlish tl)(\ prol('('lion
that the nation-slal('s - or inl<'rnational governmental. organizations, or privatr business associations, or the individual human being - get out of the
larger constitutive process. Similarly,
they are the decisions which detcrmine
the protection afforded peoples in the
usc of rcsources - the landmasses, the
ocean areas of the world, the airspace
o\,pr the ocean. out('r space. and the
polnr areas. In thesr. l('rllls. you H'C',
thl' Inw of the spa - lhc J>ublir. orcl('r
of lhl' ocpans - is simply a part of the
larg('r glohal puhlic order protected hy
world constitutive process.
If I had time I would spell out for
you some of the principal features of
this world constitutive process. It
parallels, and is entirely comparabl(' to,
that which prevails in our more maturC'
nation-states. For the moment, there are
just a few points I would emphasize.
The first is that the principal authorized decision makers in this process arc
in the first instance the officials of
nation-states, and these even inelude
naval officers. There is, of 'course, a
great range of authorized decisionmakers, including the officials of international governmental organizations as
well as nation-state officials of many
different types and degrees, but for
our present purposes this range is not
important.
The second point I would emphasize
is that this process of authoritative
decision, this constitutive process, is
established and maintained hy peoplc
who dispose of effective power in order
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to clarify and implement their common
interests and to reject all claims of special interest against the community_ In
other words, international law is, as
suggested above, a process hy which
the effective elites of the world clarify
and implement their common interests_
We wiII build on this in the description
of the law of the sea.
Another feature of constitutive process which could be emphasized is the
tremendous proliferation today of
structures of authorities, the growth of
international organizations and of arbitral tribunals, and the increase of interaction from foreign office to foreign
office. We could also note the gradual
putting into the hands of all these decisionmakers of enough effective bases
of power to put their decisions into
r/Trct. In virw of thr shortnrss of the
tilll(', we shoulcl prrhaps, however, turn
immt'diately to the law of the sea.
The law of the sea is, as we have
emphasized, an important part of the
public order that is protected by the
larger global processes of constitutive
clrrision. If we had a sharp foclls on
all the ocran arras of the world as in
Admiral Hearn's famous map illustrating all the various zones, we would begin with the internal waters, the harbors and inland waters, and find that
the authority of the nation-state is fully
comparable to what it is on the landmasses, with relatively arbitrary control
over access. Even here, however, we
could observe that there is a shared
competence, a shared authority - with
the state of the flag being accorded a
certain competence over events on
hoard these vessels, and with government ships, military vessels in particular, being largely immune from coastal
assertion. Moving outward to the territorial sea, we note that the competence
of the coastal state is slightly less: It
no longer has any right to preclude
access; it may assert its authority to

make and apply law to ships within
tbis area, to events occurring within
the area, but in practice it concedes a
still larger competence to the flag ship.
When we move out further into contiguous zones, we find that the coastal
state may assert its authority to make
and apply laws to the ships of o.ther
states, but here it has to show good
cause, it has to have good reasons in
tll(~ protection of its internal community processes. Within the territorial sea,
the application by the coastal state of
its law, if it demands such, is relatively
automatic. Beyond the territorial sea,
out in the high seas, we're supposed to
have a domain of shared competence.
This competence is established and
maintained by the application of a few
very simple rules, and we need these
hefore us if we're to understand what
('OIll('S after.
The first rule is that every state is
rntitled to the enjoyment of this great
sharable resource. It can send its ships
out without interference by other states.
It can make and apply law to its own
ships for interactions within the shared
domain. The negative counterpart rules
are that no state may preclude another
state from sending its ships out, and
that no state may make and apply law
to the ships of other states except for
violations of the law of the claimant
state and for violations of international
law. This whole structure, for protecting relatively unorganized but shared
enjoyment, is held together by another
linchpin principle, that of the nationality of ships: No state may question the
competence of another state to confer
its nationality upon a ship. This is, of
course, especially true with respect to
military vessels.
As emphasized above, this structure
of decision, this great inheritance of
the law at sea in the time of peace, contiriues to be maintained because experience has demonstrated to the effective
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elites of the world that it is by this
kind of shared use that they can best
maximize the interests and values of
all peoples. Only the willfully blind
could fail to see that the production
and distribution of goods and services
and the movements of people about the
world have been tremendously facilitated by the cooperative pooling of
capital and the specialization in skills
that the historic freedom in the enjoyment of a great sharable resource has
afforded.
Thus far we have been speaking of
the law of the sea in time of peace. In
time of war, of course, the rules and
practices are very different. As I indicated when I accepted this assignment,
I thought that I would be talking to
you about the use of force in time of
war. The assignment actually made to
me is, however, in what is commonly
called the "gray area," beginning in
time of pea(·e and coming on to time of
war. It is commonly called "gray area"
h('cause peace and war are highly amhiguous terms., The word "war" in particular has no stable, factual reference.
It's rath('r a I('~alisti<: h'rm to «('serilH'
certain consequenc('s of inLense coercion between states on certain types of
problems. If we talked in terms of facts,
we would talk in terms of varying expectations of violence and of varying
applications of the military instrument
with differing degrees of intensity in
coercion from the most modest to the
roughest. It is only the very rough extremes of coercion, and not in all instances of such rough extremes, that we
get this word "war" applied.
Our assignment today is, hence, to
consider when it is lawful for a state to
employ force on the oceans in contexts
short of the state of extreme violence to
which the word "war" may be appended and in contexts of extreme violence
when the word "war," for various
reasons, is not appended. It has already

been suggested that there are four
major types of circumstances or problems under which this question of the
application of force may become an
issue. Let's examine each of these. Because of the shortness of time I will
pass over rather quickly the prohlems
that arc rdativdy noncontroversial.
The first Sl't of problems is Lll(' ('asiest. These relate simply to the military
use or enjoyment of the oceans. With
respect to any of the great sharable
resources - the oceans, the airspace,
outer space - there are certain basic,
recurrent types of elaims. There are
claims to access for use and enjoyment;
there are claims to jurisdiction, to
make and apply law with respect to
activities in use and enjoyment; and
there ar(' claims to the appropriation
of particular resources found in the
domain of shared enjoyment. Here we
are concerned only with the first two of
these recurrent types of claims. And
for the moment only wiLh accl'SS for
use and rnjoymrnt.
You will rrmrmhl'r thaL Ihr hasic
policy of 1111' law of II\(' sra is to promoLc thl' uLmost usr and enjoyml'llt of
the oceans for the benefit of all
peoples. Now think for a moment. This
usc couldn't possibly go on srcurely,
with protrctioll of the stahle exp('ctations necessary to initiaLive and dev('lopment, without thc usc of the military
instrument. Mankind has never yrt
bern able to organize cooperative activity on a grand scale wiLhout some
threat of force, some potentiality of
force, in the background. The seas are
no different from the landmasses ill
this respect. International law is no
different from national law. Hence, it's
not surprising that the military usc of
the oceans, the ordinary use of the
oceans for military purposes, is one
that's very highly honored in international law.
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This commonsense policy is carried
still further. Even the preparation for
military usr is highly honored. For
centuries fleets have been given a
spl'cial right of way. States have bren
prrmittrd to srt aside areas of the
OCl'an for military maneuvers and exerd:-rs. Vast arC'm: of tIll' o('('an arc :-om('timl's roprd off for this purposr, Thrrr
arc no great difficulties about this. I'm
surr that you're familiar with those
procedures by which these uses are
rstablished and protected, and force is
authorized and may be used to protect
these usl'..5, Former Assistant Attorney
General Norbert Schlei, when he was
one of your correspondent students,
and I wrote an article on this in the
Yale Law Journal. It's in the collection
of essays we call "Studies in World
Puhlil' Ord('r" and colIrcls tIll' authoritiC's on this in wry gr('al d('tail,
This artiC\l' with 1\1r, Schl('i. a:- a
whoJt., is addr('ssrd to OUl' Ilrxt m;signrd
problem, which cuts a little deeper.
This prohll'lll involves setting aside of
an'as of tIll' o<'('alls for WI'apOIlS h'sl
PllrPOSI'S, Thl' maill i:-surs w('n' raised
vl'ry al'lIlI,ly II)' our Bikilli nlld Elliwl"
10k I('sls. In tllis illstatJ('(' WI' Sl't aside
a largr area of thr oceall for nuclear
trsts. There was a tremendous cry from
many quarters that this was unlawful.
What Mr. Schlei ancI I srt out to do ill
our artiC\(' was to establish the lawfulIII'SS of these tests, and we proceeded in
this way. We pointed out that the basic
rull's, the basic policies of the law of
the sea, likl' those l'mployed on the
landmasses in any national community,
travel in pairs of complementary oppositl's. This must always be true in a
pluralistic society in which there are
many claimants and many interests and
a democratic preferellce for sharing and
accommodation. Thus, there is one set
of principles which protects the inclusivl' interests of prople - the shared
l'njoymrnt in transportation, communi-

cation, cable laying, flying, and so
forth comprising the "freedom" of the
seas. Contraposed, there is another set
of principles, mentioned earlier, that
protects the exclusive interests of all
people - their interests in their int('rnal waters, the tl'rritorial sea, the
contiguous zone. and th(' continental
sh('lf, These ('xc1usiw intl'rl'sts arl'o of
course. ('quail)' the common inter('sts of
all proplr, Though no two slatrs have
precisely the same internal waters, or
precisely the same territorial sea or
contiguous zonr requirements, all states
need to protect the activities on their
landmasses from threats and dangers
from the oceans. Hence, it is not surprising that we have a set of principles
which honors and protects these exclusivc interests which are entirely
('ompll'ml'ntary to the principl('s d('sign!'d 10 proll'cl irl('lusi\'(' inll'n'sls.
Th(' funclion of n d('cisiollrnakl'r in nny
parlicular instance in which these interests have come into conflict can only
he to accommodate and reconcile them
in a way bl'st to promote the long-term,
common interests of the whole of mankind. We concluded, tht'refore, that the
people who asserted that freedom of
the seas was an absolute were simply
deluding themst'\vl's. There are no
absolutes in international law or any
other law, at least in a democratic free
society. In this instance the rational
legal task was patiently to identify
what exclusive interests the United
States was trying to protect and what
inclusive interests were being damaged
hy its activity. We found, of course,
that practically no inclusive interests
were being injured .in the slightest by
the United States te~ts, Ships would
have to go 200 miles out of the way to
get into the area. It was well off any
of the beaten tracks for hoth navigation and flying. It would interfere with
only an infinitesimal fraction of Japanese fishing. The exclusive interest of
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the United States, on the other hand,
was to prrpare weapons that could he
used for the defense, not only of the
United States but also of its allies - of
what we chose to call the whole free
world. From these perspectivrs we
urged that our use of the ocean was
clearly lawful within the compass of
the inherited principles of international
law.
I now think that we made an overkill. In putting our activities under the
label of anticipatory self-defense, we
made perhaps a stronger argument
than we needed to make. As my studies
deepened I discovered that the concept
of self-defense is not necessary for this
purpose. The concept of self-defense is
more appropriately used with respect
to an rnrmy who is immediate and spedfic. directly thrratening with military
forer. In tltr Pacific tests the actidtr of
the United States was not directrd
against any particular enemy. There
was no threat to use the military instrument against any other particular state.
It was an effort simply to make an
exclusive use of the ocean area for a
particular purpose not explicitly forbidden hy any inherited principle.
Since that time, of course, the Russians have made a comparable use of
the oceans. The French have also made
their tests. It gave me great pleasure to
see that one might be able to argue
that the French tests were unlawful. If
one balances all the various interests
carefully, the way Mr. Schlei and I
recommended, it might be possible to
give General de Gaulle a pretty hard
time on the reasonableness of his particular activities.
Hence, I think we can conclude, with
respect to our first major type of
problem, that the states of the world
are accorded a very broad authority to
enjoy and use the oceans with the military instrument. It is interesting to
contrast attitudes toward the use of the

oceans with some attitudes toward the
use of outer space. As a nonmilitary
man I've wondered a little about thic;.
People seem to get tremendously excited about the use of outer space for
military purposes. You will remember
that the Indian Government and a
numher of others tried to define the
"pracrful" uses of outer space in a way
to exclude the use of the military instrumrnt. For a layman it seems just a
little funny that people can get so
excited about potential espionage and
nuclear threats from space vehicles and
yet pay very little attention to possible
comparable threats from oceangoing
vessels. Maybe some of you can explain
the factors that make a difference.
Let's now turn to the second principal problem - the maintenance of
ord('r upon thr oceans, the claims to
jurisdiction. Had \\"(' spdh'd out the
dt'tails of thr world constitutive procrss
mentionrd earlier, one of its principal
characteristics would have been obsrrved to he its decentralization - the'
ahsellce of centralized Irgislative, judicial, executive, and rnforcement agencirs. Intrrnational law has clt'prnned
largely upon the unorganizrd, unilateral
making and enforcement of law Ill'
nation-states. The principal authorized
agents of international law are tIl!' officials of nation-states. If, thus, order is
to he maintained in the beneficent, but
highly complex, use of the ocrans, tl1<'n
it is the officials of nation-statrs who
must maintain it.
As suggested earlier, no community
in modern times has heen ahle to maintain order without having in the background either the threat, or use, of
force. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the officials of nation-states have
been authorized to assert force upon the
oceans in the maintenance of order
upon two different grounds: First for
the protection of their ('xclusive intrr-

557
t'sts, and secondly for the prott'ction of
their inclusive interests.
In our discussion above we saw that
states art' authorized by international
law to make law for their internal
waters - to regulate the use of thrse
waters, to decide who can come in, who
has to keep out, what they can do while
they'rr in there. For protecting thr
community processt's on their landmasses, statrs are similarly authorized
to rt'glllaLe thr use of thrir trrritorial
sea, to conLrol passage and interacLions
with their shores. Though there is a
right of innocent passage, it has to he
innocent and is subject to regulation.
When necessary and reasonable, states
may protect themselves still further by
rxtending contiguous zones out beyond
the territorial sea. During World War
II we had n rontigllous zOl1r for srcuriIr Ihal \\"l'lIl 0111 as far as 1.200 mill'S.
It was 1101 pruh'sh'd hr anyhlllly. Today wr aSSI'rt air idl'nlifiealion 7.0111·S
Ihal go 0111 as far as 600 mill'S or hryond. In addition, thrre art' the recenL
dl'wlopnll'nts with respect to the conLitwlltal shelf; the coastal slate is entitled to the minrral resources of the
lilwlf and ('('rtain fishrrirs.
Thr point to which I han! bren
huilding up is this: Tht' authoriLy to
prescribe law, to make law, if it is to
have any meaning must carry with it
thr authority to apply the law, decide
what it is in particular instances, and
to rnrorel' i.t. It would he uttrrly futile,
of completely illusory consequence, if
the coastal state were to be authorized
to make law for all these areas and
prohlrms hut he denied the competence
to apply the law it makes. I say this
with some vigor, because I think you
have been misled hy some of the writings to 'which you've been exposed.
There is a suggestion, which stemmed
originally from some unhistorical discussion in the International Law Commis.c;ion, that states cannot employ force

to protect their contiguous zones. This
suggestion was carried over into one
of your Blue Books, apparently written
hy om' of my former students, Profrssor Carl Franklin of the University
of Southern California, that states are
not authorized to use force to protect
weapons test areas. I submit to you that
such limitation is contrary to the practicr of srveral centuries with respect to
all killds of areas of exclusive interest
and makes no srnsr hy any rational
standard of clarification of reciprocal
common intrrests. I won't go into this
in detail, but Mr. Burke and I have
collected the authorities on this for
every type of area. It is our conclusion
that you can be reasonably sure that
states are authorized by international
law to employ force when it is necessary to apply any law which they are
aulhorizl'cI 10 makl' for thr prolrrlion
of Illl'ir Yariolls l''('lusivl' intl'rrsls.
A ('omparahle eomlll'll'J1('r is, similarly. l'slahlishrd for thr protection of tIll'
inclusive interests. You will remrmber
that we found above that upon the high
lieas each state is authorized to apply
law to its own ships for all purposes
and to the ships of other states for
violations of international law. There
nrc a numbf'r of historic examples of
this comprtence.
The simplest example derives from
thr policy of guaranteeing the nation·
ality of ships - of making certain that
every ship on the ocean is responsihle
to some state and that such state is
rrsponsihle for thr conduct of that ship.
As you all know, you do have limited
rights of inquiry to ascertain the nationality of a ship, to see that it has a
nationality. If it turns out that a ship
has no nationality, it gets very little
protection under international law
today.
This plight of thr ship without nationality is illustrated in the famous
case, discussed in your materials, of the
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Naim Molt-an [1948 A.C. 351]. The
British caml' upon the ship some miles
off the coast of Palestine. It ran up
sevl'ral flags and ran them all down
hdor(' the British warship could get to
it. hut whl'n it was hoarded, it was
c1il'cowfl'd that it had no nationality
and was running rdug('('s. It was h('ld
IlI'rfel'll), lawful for the British to tn-al
Ill{' ship quite arhitrariJ)'; it just got
no protection from allyhody.
This policy is earried out much more
l'harply with r('spect to pirates. The
paramoullt policy in maintaining the
public ord('r of thc OCl'ans is that eyerr
ship must be responsible to some state
which is in turn responsible for it.
An implementing policy is that if a
l'hip has no nationality it may be
treated, as thl' Naim llJolvan was
trl'ated. Iikl' a pirate !'hip which gl't!'
110 prol(·clion. Anyhody who ('aldll's
pimlt's. pl'oph' who un' ('ollllllilling
prh'ah' depredation for primle pur·
posel' upon Ihe O('ean5. mar apply force
to them. Ther(' are conv('ntions which
('xtend the same policy to slave trading
and a few other relatively minor ac·
tivities.
The principal point I wish to make,
for the moment, is that, by and larg(',
the maint('nance of order upon the
oceans is a function of the application
of force by the ships of nation·states.
Just as we don't have an international
police force, we have no organized,
comprehensive, collective enforcement
agency for international law. All we
have is the unorganized, unilateral com·
petence and responsibility of individual
states. Anybody who undercuts this,
who says that it doesn't exist for any
of these important purposes, is really
striking at the stability of the order
that can be maintained upon the
oc('ans. I don't think that this kind of
a strike can succ('ed.
We come next to the third major
type of problem, that of self.heIp in the

protection of national interests. To the
facts that we have previously been con·
sidering we now add the new fact that
some other state has already acted un·
lawfully toward the claimant state.
Both self.hdp and its d('rivativ(', self·
dl'f('ns(', are d('p('nd('nt for their legal
characl('rization upon th(' prior facl
Ihal sCIIlwllOdy I'lsl' has nrll',1 ulllawful·
Iy. Wilh rl'sp('('\ to th('s(' proh\('ms tlwrt,
haw 1)('(,11. in r(,Cl'nt )'C'nn'. gr('al do('·
Irinal ell'v('\opnwnts anel Illu('h ('onl(,lI'
tion among th(' doctors. Prior Lo thl'
Unitl'd Nations Charter, as you know,
e\"en major violence - war, aggression.
hreach of the peace - was not unlaw·
ful. By curious paradox, there grew up
certain rules purporting to limit minor
violence - minor coercion, reprisals,
r('taliations, retortions, et cetera. There
ar(' doz('ns of equivalent synonyms
hen-. S,'If.lwlp is p('rhaps Ih(' g('lwric
1('1"111 Ihal is ilion' usdullhan any of til('
11'l'hllical l')'non)'m!'. For s('If.lll'lp. so
g(,lIeraliz('d. th(' doctrin(' d('\'('loped that
it had to be nec('ssary and proportional.
Thl' limils. whell spdled oul. \Ie\'(' cast
l'l'sentially in thl' l'aml' Il'rms that w('
will oh!'l'r\'e for self·def('n!'('. Before
1915 thel'e limitl' didll't make much
difTen'lIel'. 1l('(,Hus(' if Oil(' irrilall'd th(,
altaek('r !,lIough. he'd simply (\Pelan'
war. allcl all limits would \)(' ofT. Sinc('
states could easily transmutl' a minor
co('rcioll into a major coercion and
l'1'eap(' thl' pn'1'crilll'd limits. the limits
werl' rdatively incons('qumtiaI.
In 1945. howC'vl'r, came tl1l' United
Nations Charter with a series of nC'\I'
limitations upon the usC' of major
coercion. Sen'ral c1aU!:;('s of the Chartcr
are relevant. The principal clauses are
articles 2 (4) and 51. Article 2 (,1)
r('ads this way: "All members shall r('·
f rain in th('ir int('rnational relationi>
from tl1(' thrC'at or U!'l' of forcl' a~ainst
thl' territorial intl'grity or political in·
dl'pendencc of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the pur·
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posrs of the Unitrd Nations." This is
the principal prohihition.
The principal authorization of force
is in article -51 which reads this way:
"Nothing in the presrnt Chartrr shall
impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a memhrr of the
Uniled Nations . . . ."
It has hren argurd, in the light of
thrs(' and other articl('s, that only two
kinds of us('s of force. transnational
force, arc now authorized. Om' is th('
s('lf-defense that is authorized undt'r
article 51, the other is the collective
police action of th(' organization which
is authorized in chapter VII of the
Charter. I'm ashamed to confcss that
at one timc I lent my support to the
sugg('stion that articl(' 2 (4.) and the
n'lat('d articles did prcclud(' th(' USI' of
sl')f-III·lp It·ss than ~w)f-ddl'ns('. On rcn(·clion. T Ihink Ihal Ihis was a wry
~ra\"(' mistakl'. thaI arlicl(' 2(:t.) and
arlicll' 51 \lI1I::;1 Ill' inl!'rprel!'d din'I'n'nlIy. Thcn' is sonll' I'\"id('m'(' that il was
Ilw int('nl of Ihl' franwrs of tlw Charll'r
10 aehi('Y(' this prohibition. What are
('all('d Ihc Irat'aliX preparatoires do conIHin 80n1l' slI~/!I'slion thaI sl'lf-dl'f('nse
and ('oll('elin' polin' a('lion \\"('n' in1t'lIdl'd In Ill' ('xc\lIsi\"(', hilI Ih(, IrlllJ(lllX
prepart1loir('.~ arc 1I0t thl' ·only sour(:('
of crill'ria for tlw intcrprctation of the
Chart!'r.
Th!'rr ar(' otlwr principII'S of interpn'tation. Ont' principlr, p('rhaps the
mosl honor('d among statrs, is that of
int('rprl'tation in accordance with the
major purposrs of the parties, sometiml's called the principl(' of effrctiven('ss. Anoth('r principle is that of interpr('tation in accordancr with suhsrqurnt conduct of thr partirs. It is IlOt
thl' prl'liminary Ilrgotiations. and not
Ihl' words of thr Chartrr only that er('at(' cont('mporary exprctations about
thr prescriptions of th(' Charter, but
tIll' words of the Chartrr, the words

that preceded it, and the whole subsequrl1t flow of words and interpretation
by conduct which are relevant to the
interpr('tation of what th!' law is today.
From this pcrspective the first important fart is thaI the machinery for
colll'ctiv(' police action projected by the
Chart!'r has nevrr heen implrm('ntrd.
W(' don't have the police fore('s for tIll'
lInih'd Nations. Ih(' coll('ctivl' machinI'ry that wen' ('xl)('('tcd to rrplacl' s(')f11I'1p. In ollll'r words. IllI'r(' has 1)(,l'n a
failun' ill cl'rlain of the major provisions for implemrnting the Charter.
If, in the light of this failure, we
consider how we can now implem('nt
thr principal purposes of minimizing
1'0C'fcion, of insuring that statt's do not
profit by cOt'rcion and violence, I submit to you that it is simply to honor
lawlt'ssn('ss to hold that the m('mh('rs of
onl' slah' (·an. wilh impunily_ allaek till'
lIalionals·· - illlli\"idllak ships. ain·raft.
or olhl'r assl'ls -- of 01111'1" sl:th'~ wilhoul any f('ar of n's)lons('. In Iltl' ahsl'I\('('
of ('nlll'('1 in' nHll'h in!'!")' 10 pmlt'('1
against attack and deprivation, I would
suggt'st that the principl(' of major purpos('s rt'quires an interpr('tation which
would honor self-help against prior unlawfulness. Tht' principle of suhsequent
conduct certainly confirms this. Many
states of the world have used force in
situations short of the requirements of
s('lf-defense to protect thrir national
inter('sts. I think it can be said al~o
that th(' International Court of Justice
has put its approval upon this practice.
In th(' Corllt Channel case tht' Court
did hold that it was unlawful for Gr('at
Britain to sweep the channel of mines,
but it didn't put much of a penalty on
Britain even for that. And it furth('r
ht'ld that it was p('rIeelly lawful for
Britain to aSSl'rt its rights hy forc(', to
srnd its warships through th(' straits
with til(' ~uns 1Il0unh'tl and rl'atly for
action if necessary.
Hence, if I had the opportunity to
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rewrit~ the hook with Mr. Fdiciano in
which we mildly questiolH'd the lawfulness of sl'lf-hdp less than sl'lf-dcfensr,
I think J would come out with a different ronclusion, as many people have.
Such a conclusion would not mean
that the usc of force for self-help to protect national interests, national
ships, national individuals, and so forLh
against prior lawlrssness - is without
limits. Such m:e of [orre musL he suhject to limitations comparahle to thosr
that self-defensl' is subject to, with due
allowance for the difference in context.
It is subject to appropriate requirements of necessity and proportionality.
One can find a great many historic exampl{,s for f{'ading content into tlH'sr
requirements. One of the best recent expositions of this historic experiencr is
hy Professor and Mrs. A. J. Thomas
of SoutlH'rn J\Te'thodi:::t llni\'ersity ill
their study on Ihe Dominiran crisis of
1965 for - 111(' Hammarskjold Forum.
puhlislwd hr the New York City Bar
As.<;ociation. This rontains, T llC'lie'vr.
the' pre'sentation that brst reconcile's the
rommon inte'rests of all mankind in the
rrgulation of these mattl'rs of self-help.
For final discussion We' turn to the
difficult problem of self-defense. Selfdefense, properly understood, is but the
most dramatic example of self-help. It
involves a demand to use the military
instrume'nt against an alleged attacker
for the protection of territorial integrity
and political indeprndence. The test
for lawfulness commonly applied is that
the target state may employ the military instrument when it reasonably
feds, as third states may ultimately
appraise reasonableness, that it is faced
with a Ihreat to its territorial integrity
or polilieal independence so immiilent
that it must itsl'If immediall'iy n'sort to
III!' unilalrralust' of tIlt' mililary inslrunll'nt in onll-r to protect itself. This
trsL involves two emphases. First, the
attacker must havc the suhjectivity to

allack the territorial inll'grity, the poliIiral indcpendenrt-. of the targ{-t. S(-Condly, it must engage in oprraliolls
that an- sufficienlly COlls(-quential 10
put the target in reasonable apprehension of destruction.
Two of the cases upon which you
han- ask('cl me to commrnt fall somewl1(-rr in th(- "I!ray an'a" IH'lw{'(-n sl'lf1H(1)1. as indicalt-d aho\'(-. and st-If·
ddt-ns!'. as 1I0W til-lilll-d. Had \\'t- fOI'llI\l·
lated for st'if-help thl- same kind of It-st
that we have just formulated for selfdefense, it would run somrthing like
this: If a statr, an alleged targrt slall'.
is subjected to a threat less intemw
than to its tl'rritorial integrity or polio
tit'al indrpl'lI{lc-nce hut to major (-xelusive inten-sts - such as involving
damage to its l'hips or othrr national
as!'!'!s - of sllrh illt(-nsily Ihal it n-a:,onahly Ihinks Ihal il mll!'t "mp]oy Ih,mililary instrtlllH-nI to prott-l'l ~l\('h
inl{-rel'ls from d(-:'Irul'tioll. it mar do so
Ui: indicated. I brlieve this is till' prrscription which is achieving a contemporary customary consensus.
Before addressing ourselves to the
Gulf of Tonkin incidc-nt, we might look
quickly at Operation Market Timr. The
regulation projected here was, J gathrr,
framed to meet the requirements of a
contiguous zone. You wiII recall that
the convention on contiguous zones
which came out of the Geneva Conferencr in 1958 attempted to confine states
to a contiguous zone of 12 miles only
and to limit the purposes for which contiguous zones can be established only
to the protection of immigration, customs, fiscal, and sanitary regulations.
The Convention deliberately left out
security. This again, I think, was hoprless confusion. Some participants in the
Conferencr insisted that security should
he lrft out because srlf-dcfensc was
enough to protect states: States didn't
need contiguous zones for security. On
the face of the matter, this is largely
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nonsense'. The requirement for establishing a contiguous zone for security,
such as the one we had in World War
II which went out 1,200 miles, has traditionally hecn only that the zone' be
r('asonable. The requirements for selfdefense are, as we have just seen,
n('('el'sity and proportionality - much
stricter requirements.
I do not believe that the states of
the world can Ii\'(' with the contiguous
zonc provisions of the Geneva Convention. Thesl' provisions would repeal
literally hundreds of statutes long regard('d as of importance to national
welfare, of thl' United' Stat('s and of
otll('r states. Self-def('nse alone is not
an adequate concept to serve the security needs of states in the contemporary
world. SOOl1<'r or later We' will wake up
and g('t rid of th('s(' limiting restrictions on purpo!'(' and distane('.
The I\IarkPt Time prodsions arl' thl'
bl'st d('monstration of the unworkability
of tIl(' Geneva Convention. Note first
this fantastic limitation to 3 mill'S; then
one can go out for a few more purposes
to 12 miles. It is incredible to me that
thig op('ration could be dfective if it
gtopg at 12 mil(·g. It would appear an
utl('rly futile thing within such limiLc;.
Rather than trying to live within the
sort of straitjacket exemplified in
th('s(' regulations, it would have been
openly to invoke the doctrine of selfd('fl'nse for exercises anywhere on the
oe('an. The requirements of necessity
and proportionality would appear easily m('t.
The Tonkin Gulf incident came in
1964, as I recall. As a layman I'm not as
familiar with th(' fact here as you may
h('. but it is my understanding that two
of our warships w('r(' attacked upon the
high gl'as som(' ~O milC's off the shore'S
of North Vi('tnam by torpedo boats in
fog or darkness and that we responded
in two ways. First, we struck back at

the boats. the torpedo boats, and destroyed a number of them; secondly, we
later bombarded certain parts of the
North Vietnamese shore. All this was
before we were as deeply involved in
th(' hostilities as we now are. With respect to the immediate reaction to the
torpedo boats, I don't think there can
b(' til(' slightest clouht. This can be put
und('r s('lf-d('femw or e'\'('/1 unde'r sC'lfhelp that Wt' were' diseusging earlier.
H('re our asse'ts, our bas('s of power are
he'ing attack('d; hence, we can use such
force as is n('eessary and proportional
to protect them.
With respect to the bombardment of
th(' shore, a question is raised comparable to that raised by the Israeli occupation of Syria: Whether in assertion
of sr.Jf-defense a state can go beyond
the imm('diatc repelling of the attack
and pn'par(' itsC'lf to pr('\'('nt attaekg in
the Tuturt,. I gather that our obje'ctive'
of hombarding the' shor(' was simply
to discourage future incidents of the
same kind - to demonstrate our det('rmination to be there, to ass('rt our
rights both to enjoy the oceans and to
a!'sist South Vietnam if we chose to.
The important question is: Was the'
bombarding that we did rl'asonably
proportional to these perf('ctly lawful
purposes? Subsequent events would appear to hav(' answered very definitely
in th(' affirmativ('. At that time we did
not know how deeply China was involved or how deeply Russia was involved. We didn't really know who the
('nemy was. Extreme measures could
rl'asonahly h(' said to he necessary
to discourage whoever was engaging in
these attacks. Since that time the North
Vietnames(', of course, have opl'nly
attackl'd South Vietnam, and w(' have
gone to the defense of South Vietnam.
The mere fact that th(' attacks have continued and intensified gives us, I think,
an appropriate verdict of both necessity and proportionality.
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Let mt' say just onr or two words
about a drar seI£-deft'nse type of sitllation, thr Cuhan quarantine. Remrmbrr that thr t{'st for lawfulness hrre is
whl'thrr or not Russia had the subj{'ctivitil's of attack and was rngaging in
oprrations which reasonably put us
upon apprdwnsion of dangpr to our
territorial integrity and political indl'prndpncp. Fully to makr such a case
would require a {'arrful contextual !'xamination of all III(' facts: Who tIll'
parties werl', what thrir objectives
wrre, what thr timr and geographir
£!'atll1'l's of th!' situation were, what
hases of power tIll' parties were brinp:ing to hear. what strategies they Wl'fI'
('mployinp:, th!' intensities in I'Xp('('tations of violl'ncl'. and so forth. As I
said, Ihe threat came from Russia - a
state fuIIy as pow!'rflll as WI'. Russia
was moving into an an'a traditi(lnally
(lnl' of ollr ddensl' arl'a5. TIll' ;\Ionrtll'
Doctrine had for decades asserted our
sppcial interest. Russia was moving
with offrnsive weapons that would cut
ollr reartion time down from 6 or 7
minutes to'some 3 minutes. Her objectiv!'s were obviously expansive, not
simply conservatory. This was an area
in which she hadn't previously asserted
a military presence of such magnitude.
A disintprested observer cOllld easily
sprU out the requirements for necPssity

and proportionality. Th!' response that
we made was as limited as it could
possihly have heen and stil! have usrd
thr mililary instrumrnt. The use of the
mililary instrumrnt IIpon the oceans is
milch less grievous than its usr on the
landmasses; it can be used upon the
ocrans with much less d{'struction of
the hases of power of oth{'r states.
H('nc{', many ohservers havr had no
difficulty in finding the Cuban quarantine lawful.
If timp permitted I would apply thr
fundamental policies rdating to srIrdefense and aggression to othe-1' instances such as in the Arab-hraeJi connict or Vil'tnam. I'm sure that you're
deeply engagrd in such study. Perhaps
I should now simply reemphasizr that
tIl(' hasil' policies that control all fOIlf
typ('s of prohlpms with whirh wr hayl'
hl'('n conreFllrd arl' Ihe common intl'r('sIs of tIl(' peopll' who hold ('fT('etiV!'
powcr in tIll' larger an'na. All claims
must he madr with a promise of reciprocity and mutuality. From this perspp('tin' a very broad and comprrhensi,'e usr of forcl' for tIll' uni1atrrul
maintl'nan('e of pulllie order upon tIl('
o('pans can hc justi fil'c1 in the contpmporary world - especially in the
lip:ht of the failure of thl' United Nalions l\(II'quatl'l}, to ('I'ntralizl' an l'fT('r·
ti,,' ('olh'din- pl'a('I' forc('.
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